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European Central Bank working paper series 42Abstract
This paper addresses a very European issue, the consolida-
tion of securities trading and settlement infrastructures. In a
two-country model, we analyze welfare implications of diﬀerent
types of consolidation. We ￿nd that horizontal integration of set-
tlement systems is better than vertical integration of exchanges
and settlement systems, but vertical integration is still better
than no consolidation. These ￿ndings have clear policy implica-
tions with regards to the highly fragmented European securities
infrastructure.
Keywords: Securities trading and settlement, vertical and
horizontal integration, substitutes and complements.
JEL Classi￿cations: G21, G15, L13.
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Securities trading and securities settlement are essential parts of any
securities transaction. Trading is the process that results in an agree-
ment between a seller and a buyer to exchange securities for funds.
Settlement refers to the actual transfer of securities from the seller to
the buyer and the transfer of the funds from the buyer to the seller.
Trading is often carried out on securities exchanges while settlement of
on-exchange trades takes place in entities called central securities depos-
itories (CSDs).
In the European Union, the securities trading and settlement in-
frastructure is highly fragmented. There are over 20 national exchanges
and about as many central securities depositories (CSDs) in the EU.
Market participants, central banks and regulators agree that consolida-
tion is desirable. However, there is little agreement on what kind of
consolidation would be optimal. Some people prefer vertical integra-
tion, i.e. mergers of exchanges with CSDs. Others favour horizontal
integration of diﬀerent exchanges or diﬀerent CSDs.
In this paper, we try to shed light on the pros and cons of the dif-
ferent types of consolidation in a theoretical two-country model. There
is an exchange and a CSD in each country. Investors can buy and sell
securities on both exchanges. All trades executed on a given exchange
are settled in the CSD of the same country. This re￿ects the current
practice in all major markets. Hence, before a security held in the CSD
of country 1 can be oﬀered on the exchange of country 2,i th a st ob e
transferred to the CSD in country 2. This transfer is carried out through
a so-called link, technologically a communication line between the two
CSDs. A link transfer requires the services of both CSDs. One CSD
has to release the securities and the other CSD has to take them under
custody.
We start from a general observation that has been well established in
industrial economics. From an economic welfare perspective, two goods
that are substitutes should be supplied by diﬀerent decision makers while
two complements should be supplied by a single decision maker. On the
basis of this observation, we argue as follows. The link services of the
two CSDs are complements since each securities transfer from one to
the other CSD requires both services. Furthermore, the link service of
one CSD and the settlement service of the other CSD are complements
since transferring securities from one to the other country makes sense
only if these securities are afterwards traded and thus settled in the
other country. The two CSDs should therefore be operated by the same
decision maker (horizontal integration of CSDs).
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the link are low enough to allow the cross-border transfer of securities
at reasonable costs. If the link is too expensive, a horizontal integration
of the CSDs is desirable only if it reduces these link operating costs
signi￿cantly. If it does not reduce these costs, a vertical integration of
the exchange and the CSD in each country is preferable. This is because
trading and settlement in a given country are also complements.
Furthermore, if there is no demand for foreign securities, there is also
no demand for link transfers regardless of whether the link operating
costs are high or low. In this case, the link has no signi￿cance and
the above argument in favour of horizontal integration of the CSDs is
again not valid. Instead we again ￿nd that a vertical integration of
the exchange and the CSD in each country is preferable as trading and
settlement in a given country are complements.
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The European securities trading and settlement infrastructure is highly
fragmented. There are over 20 national exchanges and about as many
central securities depositories (CSDs) in the EU. Market participants,
central banks and regulators agree that consolidation is desirable. How-
ever, there is little agreement on what kind of consolidation would be op-
timal. Some people prefer vertical integration, i.e. mergers of exchanges
with CSDs (and clearing houses). Others favour horizontal integration
of diﬀerent exchanges or diﬀerent CSDs. In this paper, we try to shed
some light on the pros and cons of the diﬀerent types of consolidation in
a theoretical model.
In practice, all kinds of integration have been taking place in recent
years. In Italy and in a similar way in Germany, the exchange and the
CSD have been merged to form a so-called vertical silo. The merger of
the exchanges of France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal have
created Euronext. The CSDs of France, the Netherlands, the UK and
Belgium have been merged into Euroclear Group.
Securities exchanges and CSDs play essential roles in all major secu-
rities markets. Exchanges help to match buyers and sellers of securities.
CSDs are central store houses for securities. In most countries, there
is only one CSD and almost all securities issued under the country￿s
legislation are stored there for their entire life - as physical papers or
increasingly often electronically. Furthermore, CSDs maintain records
establishing ownership of securities. Major ￿nancial institutions have
securities accounts with the CSD and the account balances indicate the
securities owned by the respective ￿nancial institution (or its direct or in-
direct clients). Finally, CSDs act as major settlement service providers:
they organize the transfer of securities from a seller to a buyer. If one
￿nancial institution sells securities to another, the transaction is settled
by book entries in the book of the CSD: The seller￿s securities account
with the CSD is debited and the buyer￿s securities account is credited.
Exchanges and CSDs cooperate closely. Most exchanges use for rea-
sons of costs or for legal reasons only one CSD to settle all trades ex-
ecuted on the exchange. All members of the exchange have to have
(directly or via an intermediary) securities accounts with that CSD.
Whenever two exchange members - a seller and a buyer - are matched
on the exchange, the CSD receives automatically from the exchange the
instructions to debit the seller￿s and to credit the buyer￿s securities ac-
count. This process is called straight through processing (STP).
Special problems arise in case of cross-listed securities if the two
exchanges on which the securities are listed use diﬀerent CSDs for set-
tlement. Assume that an exchange  uses only CSD  and another
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 securities held on his account with CSD . B e f o r eh ec a nd ot h a t ,
the securities have to be transferred from CSD  to CSD .F o r t h i s
purpose, CSDs maintain so-called (direct or indirect) links. Only after
the securities have been credited to an account with CSD ,t h e yc a n
be sold on exchange .
In this paper, we analyze the interactions between exchanges and
CSDs in a two-country model. There is an exchange and a CSD in both
countries. There are two types of securities, country  securities and
country  securities. There are two types of investors, country  and
country  investors. Initially, all country  securities are held by country
 investors on accounts with CSD  and all country  securities are held
by country  investors with CSD . Initially, all investors are members
of their home exchange and CSD, but not of the foreign exchange and
CSD. All securities are listed on both exchanges. All trades executed
on exchange  must be settled in CSD  and all trades executed on
exchange  must be settled in CSD . The two CSDs maintain a link
so that securities can be transferred from one CSD to the other. Country
 investors want to buy  securities and country  investors want to
buy  securities, i.e. due to investors￿ preferences, only trades between
investors from diﬀerent countries are possible.1
There are two ways to initiate transactions for example between a
country  investor who wants to sell security  and a country  in-
vestor who wants to buy security . Firstly, the  investor oﬀers the
securities on exchange  and the  investor orders them on exchange
. Settlement takes place in CSD  and the link is not used. This is
relatively costly for the  investor who needs to become a (directly or
indirectly through an intermediary) member of exchange  and CSD .
Secondly, the  investor transfers the securities through the link from
CSD  to CSD  a n dt h e no ﬀers them on exchange  while the 
investor orders them on exchange . This is costly for the  investor
who needs to transfer his securities through the link and must become
a (direct or indirect) member of exchange  and CSD .
Link transfers must be carried out jointly by the two CSDs. A crucial
exogenous parameter of the model is the operating costs of the CSDs for
providing the link service. Each CSD sets a price the investor has to
pay for this service. Furthermore, each exchange sets a price for the
execution of trades and each CSD sets a price for the settlement of
1This is a strong assumption. However, in section 6, we note the eﬀects of includ-
ing investors￿ demand for home securities.
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We analyze four diﬀerent industry structures: (1) Under complete
separation (CS), all four service providers are operated by diﬀerent in-
dependent ￿rms and set their prices independently. (2) Under vertical
integration (VI), the exchange and the CSD in both countries are op-
erated by the same ￿rm and thus coordinate their price setting. (3)
Under horizontal integration of the CSDs, both CSDs are operated by
the same ￿rm. The exchanges are operated independently. We distin-
guish two stages of horizontal integration: (a) Purely legal integrations
(LHI): Though the CSDs are operated by the same ￿r m ,t h e ya r et e c h -
nologically still diﬀerent systems. The transfer of securities through the
link entails the same operating costs for the CSDs as under CS and VI.
But the CSDs set their prices for the link transfer as well as for the
settlement of on-exchange trades in a coordinated way. (b) Technical in-
tegration (THI): Both CSDs are technologically merged into one system
so that a transfer of securities from one to another CSD does not entail
any operating costs so that the operating costs of the link are zero.
Horizontal integration of CSDs may indeed always lead eventually
to THI. However, analyzing LHI is still not redundant since it helps
to distinguish two eﬀects of the transition from CS to THI. This is a
pure competition eﬀect illustrated by the transition from CS to LHI.
And a cost reduction eﬀect illustrated by the transition from LHI to
T H I .A n yk i n do fm e r g e rm a yh a v et h e s et w oe ﬀects. This positive cost
reduction eﬀect may however be outweighed by a negative competition
eﬀect. Analyzing LHI as an intermediate step in the transition from CS
to THI helps to distinguish these two eﬀects of horizontal integration of
CSDs.
A welfare comparison of the four industry structures is the center of
our attention. The results of this comparison are strikingly simple: VI
and LHI entail a (weakly) higher welfare then CS. That is, the compe-
tition eﬀects of the transition from CS to LHI and from CS to VI are
positive. If the link operating costs under CS, VI and LHI exceed a
certain threshold, then VI entails a higher welfare then LHI so that the
competition eﬀect is greater in the transition to VI than in the transi-
tion to LHI. If the operating costs of the link under CS, VI and LHI are
small than this threshold, then LHI entails a higher welfare then VI, i.e.
the competition eﬀect is greater in a transition to LHI. However, THI
always entails the highest economic welfare of all four structures. In
other words, even if the competition eﬀect of a transition from CS to VI
2Some CSDs and exchanges are user owned. In these cases, one may argue that
the assumption of pro￿t maximization is not realistic. However, many CSDs and
exchanges are organised as pro￿t maximising entities.
on-exchange trades. All four service providers are operated by pro￿t
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welfare improvement is still greatest in case of a transition to THI due
to its cost reduction eﬀect.
Before we explain the economic reasons for these results, it is helpful
to recall a ￿nding from basic industrial economics.3 Consider a standard
Bertrand duopoly. In this setting, a merger of the two ￿rms would
decrease the economic welfare if the outputs of the ￿rms are substitutes
(provided that the merger does not reduce production costs). However,
if the outputs are complements, then the merger would increase the
welfare. The reason is the following: If two ￿rms produce substitutes
and the price of both ￿r m si sr e l a t i v e l yh i g h ,t h e no n e￿rm can easily
attract more demand by reducing its price a bit and boost up its pro￿t.
In equilibrium, both ￿rms therefore set relatively low prices. If the ￿rms
instead produce (perfect) complements, then the demand at both ￿rms
depends on the sum of the prices of the two goods. Tourists for example
consider the sum of the prices for the ￿ight to a holiday destination
and for the accommodation there. If the ￿ight is cheap, they have high
demand for hotel rooms even if these are relatively expensive. If now
both ￿rms set a relatively low price, one ￿rm would not lose too much
demand even if it increases its price signi￿cantly so that a higher price
would result in a higher pro￿t. In equilibrium, both ￿rms therefore
set relatively high prices. However, if now both ￿rms merge and the
new entity reduces the prices of the two complements, its pro￿tw o u l d
increase. Thus, the sum of the prices of the two complements would be
lower if the two ￿rms are vertically integrated.
Looking again on our model, we ￿nd that the exchange and the
CSD of the same country oﬀer perfect complements since trading on
the exchange requires settlement in the CSD. This is why VI entails a
higher welfare then CS. Now compare LHI and VI. Firstly note that
(trading and) settlement in country  and (trading and) settlement in
country  are substitutes. However, the link service provided by CSD
 and the link service provided by CSD  are perfect complements.
From that perspective, it is not immediately clear whether LHI or VI
leads to a higher welfare. The reason why VI leads to a higher welfare
than LHI if the link operating costs are high is simple. In this case,
transferring securities through the link is too costly, i.e. the link is
not used and securities are always traded where they are initially held.
Thus, the CSDs in fact do not compete at all, neither in substitutes nor
in complements. CS and LHI now lead exactly to the same equilibrium.
However, VI leads to lower prices than CS and LHI and thus to a higher
welfare because the exchange and the CSD of the same country oﬀer
3See for example Tirole (1988) and Shy (1996).
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than VI if the link operating costs are low is a bit more complex and
will be discussed in detail later.4
Finally, it is clear that THI leads to a higher welfare than LHI due to
cost reductions. Thus, it is clear that THI is the best if the link operating
costs are low since LHI is better than CS and VI in this case. However,
if the link operating costs are high, then LHI is not better anymore than
VI. But now, the cost reduction eﬀect of THI is even more signi￿cant
and THI is still better than all other industry structures.
Our ￿ndings have obvious implications for the policy discussion on
what kind of consolidation may be most desirable for the European se-
curities trading and settlement infrastructure. However, it is important
to draw attention to two important limitations of our model. Firstly,
we assume that the exchanges cannot choose which CSD they use. Each
exchange has to settle on the CSD located in the exchange￿s country.
This assumption clearly reduces the potential competition between the
two CSDs signi￿cantly. If under CS, the CSDs were forced to compete
with each other for the exchanges, then any type of horizontal integra-
tion of the CSDs may result in a negative competition eﬀect. Currently,
national exchanges are to a large extent bound to use exclusively the
respective national CSD so that our assumption seems to be realistic
enough. However, this may change at some point and it would be inter-
esting to analyze the implications of such a change. Secondly we do not
allow for OTC trading, i.e. assume that trading exclusively takes place
on an exchange. Though this may appear realistic for equities, it is less
realistic for bonds.
There is a large body of literature on vertical integration. An overview
is in Perry (1989). Most applications of the theory of vertical integra-
tion are on network industries in which a monopolistic upstream ￿rm
(supplier of a network) produces an essential input for several compet-
ing downstream ￿rms (users of the network). The main issue is the
implications of a vertical merger of the upstream ￿rm with one of the
downstream ￿rms. A prominent example is Vickers (1995). However,
our study largely diﬀers from this literature in the following aspects.
There is no analogy of downstream/upstream ￿rms in a trading and set-
tlement system. Exchange do not receive services from and do not make
payments to CSDs and the other way round. Furthermore, there is only
one upstream ￿rm in network industries while we have two exchanges
and two CSDs in our model.
Another body of literature looks at competition among intercon-
nected networks like two operator of mobile phone networks. See for
4See the two paragraphs after proposition 7.
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Tirole (1996). The situation analyzed by this literature somehow resem-
bles the competition between two CSDs connected by a link. However,
the literature on competition among interconnected networks focuses
mainly on access price regulation while vertical integration is not an
issue.
There is some literature on competition, cooperation and consolida-
tion of securities exchanges. Examples are Domowitz (1995) and Shy and
Tarkka (2001). A general discussion of competition among exchanges
with a special view to Europe is Di Noia (1998). In this type of lit-
erature, exchanges are often considered as networks and consolidation
of diﬀerent networks as a way to pool liquidity in one place.5 There is
currently very little literature on competition and consolidation of dif-
ferent settlement service providers. Examples are the empirical paper
by Schmiedel, Malkamaki and Tarkka (2002), the theoretical work of
Holthausen and Tapking (2003), Kauko (2003) and Koeppl and Monnet
(2003). Kauko (2003) is related to our paper in that it looks at links
as devices that create competition between CSDs. Koeppl and Monnet
(2003) is to our knowledge the only other paper that looks at exchanges
and CSDs in one model. They show in a two-country model with an
exchange and a CSD in each country that due to asymmetric informa-
tion, an eﬃcient merger of the CSDs is diﬃcult to achieve if initially the
exchange and the CSD are integrated in both countries.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the assumption
of our model. Since our model is a two-stage model, we analyze the two
stages in turn in the sections 3 and 4. Section 3 looks at the behavior of
investors for given prices of the exchanges and CSDs. Section 4 analyses
the price setting behavior of the exchanges and CSDs under the four
diﬀerent industry structures described above. Finally, the welfare im-
plications of the diﬀerent industry structures are determined in section
5.
2 The model
There are two countries  and . There is a stock exchange in each
country. Furthermore, there is a CSD in both countries. All trades on
the stock exchange of country  are settled in the CSD of country 
and all trades on the stock exchange of country  are settled in the
CSD of country . For each trade executed on exchange  and then
s e t t l e di nC S D, both the seller and the buyer have to pay 
 to stock




Working Paper Series No. 387
August 2004exchange  and 
 to CSD . Similarly, the prices in country  are 

and 
. The exchanges￿ marginal costs for executing a trade are  and
the CSDs￿ marginal costs for settling a trade executed on an exchange
are .
The two CSDs maintain a bilateral (direct) link which can be used
to transfer securities from one CSD to the other. For each transfer, CSD
 charges a price  and CSD  charges . Each CSD incurs marginal
costs of  for such transfers.
In each country, there is a set [01] of investors. Each country 
investor is a member of stock exchange  and of CSD  (i.e. has a
securities account in CSD ). Similarly, each country  investor is a
member of stock exchange  a n do fC S D (i.e. has a securities account
in CSD ). Initially, no country  investor is a member of exchange
 or CSD  and no country  investor is a member of exchange 
or CSD . However, any investor can decide to become a (direct or
indirect) member of the foreign stock exchange and CSD to be able to
trade there. For simplicity, we assume that the exchanges and CSDs do
not ask for a fee for this remote access. However, the (exogenous) costs
for establishing remote access -  for access to the respective exchange
and  for access to the respective CSD - are borne by the investor.
These costs refer to for example IT facilities an investor needs to set up
and maintain to have remote access. We de￿ne  =  + as the overall
costs for remote access.6
There are two stocks. Stock  has been issued into CSD  and stock
 has been issued into CSD . Both stocks are listed (and quoted) on
both exchanges and thus eligible for settlement in both CSDs. Initially,
each country  investor owns one share of stock  w h i c hi sk e p to nh i s
account with CSD .E a c hc o u n t r y investor owns one share of stock
 which is kept on his account with CSD .C o u n t r y investors can
sell stock  and buy stock  and country  investors can sell stock
 and buy stock . However, buying or selling abroad requires that
the investor ￿rst becomes a member of the foreign exchange and CSD.
Moreover, selling abroad requires that the investor ￿rst transfers his
share to the foreign CSD.
An investor￿s bene￿t of holding stocks depends on the location of the
investor: For  investor  ∈ [01],t h eb e n e ￿t of holding one share of
stock  is  and the bene￿t of holding one share of stock  is 1−.F o r
 investor  ∈ [01],t h eb e n e ￿t of holding on share of stock  is  and
the bene￿t of holding one share of stock  is 1 − . Each investor has
6If an investor is member of the foreign exchange and CSD indirectly through an
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Alternative 1 Do not trade
Alternative 2 Sell home stock at home, do not trade foreign stock
Alternative 3 Sell home stock abroad, do not trade foreign stock
Alternative 4 Do not trade home stock, buy foreign stock at home
Alternative 5 Do not trade home stock, buy foreign stock abroad
Alternative 6 Sell home stock at home, buy foreign stock at home
Alternative 7 Sell home stock at home, buy foreign stock abroad
Alternative 8 Sell home stock abroad, buy foreign stock at home
Alternative 9 Sell home stock abroad, buy foreign stock abroad
Let  ≡ 
+
,  ≡ 
+
 and  ≡ +.F o rc o u n t r y investor









 −  −  − 
4 	4
 =  +1−  − 
 − 
5 	5
 =  +1−  − 
 −  − 
6 	6
 = 




 +1−  − 
 −  −  − 
8 	8
 = 
 +1−  − 
 −  −  −  − 
9 	9
 = 
 +1−  − 
 −  −  − 2
Whenever we use in this paper symbols with subscripts consisting of two
letters, each either  or  (e.g. 
, , ), then the ￿rst letter
refers to a stock and the second to a country. Here, 
 is the price
of stock  in country , 
 is the price of stock  in country  and

 and 
 denote the respective prices in country .I f w e r e p l a c e
in the table the index  by  and the index  by  wherever  and
 occur, then we get the bene￿ts of country  investor  ∈ [01] for
each of his nine alternatives. Note that there are economies of scope in





an investor who has made the investments + necessary to sell abroad




Decisions are taken in two steps. First, the two exchanges and the





and . Second, each investor selects one alternative out of his nine
alternatives to maximize his bene￿t given all six transaction prices and
all four stock prices. Simultaneously, the four stock prices take values
such that all four stock markets are in equilibrium.
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trading and settlement since we allow for direct remote access to the
foreign exchange and CSD as well as indirect remote access through an
intermediary. However, it is assumed that all trades are executed on
an exchange. In other words, we assume that there is no international
custodian bank that could internalize international buy and sell orders
without routing them to an exchange.
3 Stock market equilibrium
In this section, we discuss the stock market equilibrium for given trans-
action prices. Determining the stock market equilibrium is quite a cum-









,  and , the demand and
supply functions for stock  in country  ( and ), for stock 
in country  ( and ), for stock  in country  ( and )
and for stock  in country  ( and ) have to be determined.





,  and , the stock market equilibrium has to
be found. A stock market equilibrium for given transaction prices is





that  =  = ,  =  = ,  =  =  and
 =  = .H e r e ,, ,  and  are the equilibrium
trading volumes in the four stock markets.
However, we show in Appendix B that with this de￿nition, there are
under some parameter constellations multiple stock market equilibria
with diﬀerent trading volumes. For this reason, we apply the following
re￿nement: If  6= , there may be two equilibria - one characterized
by  =  =0and another by  =  =0 . In this case, we select
the former if    and the latter if  
 .I f = ,t h e r em a yb e
in￿nitely many equilibria. In this case, we select the one characterized
by  =  and  = .T h i sr e ￿nement ensures that we have to
consider exactly one equilibrium for most parameter constellations. The
equilibrium is given by the following two propositions.
Proposition 1 If  ≥ , then the stock market equilibrium for given
transaction prices is characterized by the following trading volumes:
I) If   ,t h e n
 =  =m a x {1
2 − 1
4( + ) − 0},  =  =0 .
II) If   ,t h e n
 =  =m a x {1
2 − 1
4( + ) − 0},  =  =0 .
III) If  = ,t h e n
 =  =  =  =m a x {1
4 − 1
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cheap and becoming a member of the exchange and the CSD of the
foreign country is relatively expensive. In this case, we ￿nd that the
investors are very sensitive regarding the diﬀerence between  and .
As soon as these prices are not equal, all stocks are transferred via the
link from the country with the higher to the country with the lower
trading and settlement price and all trade takes place in the country
with the lower price. I.e. trading and settlement in country  and
trading and settlement in country  are perfect substitutes.
Note that if  = , all linear combinations of the trading volumes
under I) and II) would characterize an equilibrium if we did not use the
above re￿nement. Since we have  =  =  =  for  = ,
half of the trading country  investors sell in country  and half of the
trading country  investors sell in country . These are the investors
who use the link. Furthermore, it follows that these and only these
investors buy abroad. I.e. every trading investor either uses the link by
himself or trades with an investor who uses the link. And those investors
who do not use the link do not become members of the foreign exchange
and the foreign CSD. In other words, for given trading volumes, remote
membership is created as little as possible and the link is used as much




  = 
,i . e .
the investors who use the link are compensated by favorable stock prices
for the additional transaction costs they bear. This also implies that
the investors exploit the economies of scope mentioned in the previous
section: No investor will ever sell abroad and buy at home.
The situation looks very diﬀerent in case that  ≤ :
Proposition 2 If  ≤ , then the stock market equilibrium for given
transaction prices is characterized by the following trading volumes:
I) If | − | ≤ 1
2( − ),t h e n
 =m a x {1−
2 − 0},  =m a x {1−
2 − 0},  =  =0 .
II) If  −  ≥ 1
2( − ),t h e n
 =m a x {1−
2 − 0},  =m a x {
1−	
2 − 0},  =  =0 .
III) If  −  ≥ 1
2( − ),t h e n
 =m a x {1−
2 − 0},  =m a x {
1−	
2 − 0},  =  =0 .
If  is relatively low and  relatively high, the link is relatively ex-
pensive and becoming a member of the foreign exchange and CSD is
relatively cheap. In this case, we ￿nd that  and  are positive and
 =  =0 , if the diﬀerence between  and  is moderate. I.e.
investors from both countries become members of the respective foreign
exchange and CSD and the link is not used. Stock  is traded only in
16
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ence between  and  is suﬃciently high, all stocks are transferred
via the link from the country with the higher to the country with the
lower trading and settlement price and all trade takes place in the coun-
try with the lower price. I.e. trading and settlement in country A and
trading and settlement in country B are now imperfect substitutes.7
4 Transaction price equilibrium
After determining the stock market trading volumes in equilibrium for
given transaction prices, we now look at the ￿rst stage of the model.
Here, the transactions prices are set by the two exchanges and the two
CSDs.
4.1 Payoﬀ functions
To begin with, we de￿ne the payoﬀ functions of the players. The pro￿t
function of exchange  is de￿ned by








and for exchange ,w eg e t








Note that an exchange receives the price 
 or 
 twice for each trade
executed because both the seller and the buyer have to pay the price.
This is way the trading quantities are multiplied by 2.H o w e v e r ,  is
de￿ned as the costs of the exchange for executing a trade.
For the CSDs, we get
















)+(  + )( − )
The ￿rst term refers to the pro￿ts from settling trades on the respective
exchange, while the second term refers to pro￿ts from operating the link.
7Note that 2 describes two equilibria for | − | = 1
2( − ). In fact, all linear
combinations of these two equilibria are also equilibria in this case. We have omitted
a detailed description of this case, because it has no impact on the further analy-
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 = 
 + 
 and  = 
 + 
 as the pro￿to fac o m p a n yo p e r a t i n g
both the exchange and the CSD in the respective country (vertical inte-
gration of exchange and CSD). The pro￿t of a company operating both
CSDs would be  = 
 + 
 (horizontal integration in settlement).
In the following three sections, we analyze the equilibrium trans-
action prices and trading volumes under diﬀerent industry structures.
However, before we enter into the analysis, a few things should be noted.
First, for any given parameter constellation, there is a multiplicity of
no-trade equilibria which we will ignore. Assume that both exchanges
set prices that are so high that the demand for trade would be zero
even if both settlement (and link) prices are zero. It is clear that any
settlement prices are best responses of the operators of the CSDs. Anal-
ogously, assume that both CSDs set settlement prices that are so high
that the demand for trade would be zero even if both trading prices are
zero. Now any trading prices are best responses of the exchanges. Thus,
there are always equilibria with no trade and prohibitively high prices
for trading and settlement. Since such equilibria describe extreme coor-
dination failures and characterize hardly interesting trading allocations,
we ignore them.
Second, under certain circumstances there are equilibria in which the
marginal costs for trading and/or for the settlement of trades are higher









2).8 We ignore these equilibria, too.
Finally, to avoid corner solutions in equilibrium, we assume  ≥ 0
and  ≥ 0 with




 −  −  − 
4.2 Complete separation
To begin with, we look at an industry in which all four service providers
are operated independently by diﬀerent companies. We concentrate on





 = . The following proposition describes an equilibrium in which
the link is used.
Proposition 3 If  − 2 
 2, then there is one and only one sym-
metric equilibrium in which the link is used.
8This is possible because companies that oﬀer more than one service, for example
settlement and link services or - in case of vertical integration - trading and settlement
services, can cross-subsidize the diﬀerent services.
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If −2  2, then there is no symmetric equilibrium in which the link
is used.
First note that only if the operating costs  of the link are suﬃciently
low, there is an equilibrium in which the link is used. Note also that in
this equilibria, both the trading and the settlement prices are equal to
marginal costs. The reason is that if  is low, so then are the prices 
and  for the link and it is cheap to substitute trading and settlement
in one country for trading and settlement in the other country. The
exchange and the CSD in country  enter into perfect price competition
with the exchange and CSD in country . This leads to a situation
in which the prices equal marginal costs. Note that part (2) of the
proposition describes corner cases with  =  = 1
2.
According to proposition 3, an equilibrium in which the link is used
exists only if  − 2 
 2. However, there is always an equilibrium in
which the link is not used:
Proposition 4 There are always symmetric equilibria in which the link























,  =  =0
One might not be surprised to ￿nd an equilibrium in which the link is
not used, if  is high. It is also not a surprise that in such an equilibrium,
trading and settlement prices are higher than marginal costs since there
is no (direct) competition between the two countries if  and thus the
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is not used, if  is low? The reason is a simple coordination problem:
If for example  i s ,s a y ,h i g h e rt h a n, then the link will not be used no
matter how low  is. CSD  has therefore no reason not to set  
 .
For the same reasons, CSD  has now no reason not to set  
 .T h u s ,
 =  ≥  always constitutes an equilibrium.
Thus, we do not have a unique equilibrium, if −2 
 2.H o w e v e r ,
there are good reasons to select in this case the equilibrium described in
proposition 3. Firstly, it is easy to show that the CSDs reach a higher
pro￿t in the equilibrium described in proposition 3 than in the one of
proposition 4. Secondly, we have argued in the previous subsection that
we do not consider equilibria in which there is no trade at all due to
coordination failures. For the same reasons, we can ignore the equilibria
of proposition 4 in case that −2 
 2.I . e .f r o mn o wo n ,w ea s s u m e
that the CSDs coordinate on the equilibrium described in proposition 3
whenever  − 2 
 2.
4.3 Vertical Integration
We now assume that in both countries the CSD and the exchange are
operated by the same ￿rm. The operator of the silo in country  sets 
,

 and , the operator of the other silo simultaneously sets 
, 
 and





 and  =  and ￿nd:
Proposition 5 Proposition 3 holds also under vertical integration.
The economic intuition for this result is of course the same as for
proposition 3. If  is low, it is cheap to transfer securities from one
country to the other. The operator of the exchange and the CSD in
country  and the operator of those in country  enter into perfect
competition so that trading and settlement fees go down to marginal
costs.
As under complete separation, there is always an equilibrium in which
the link is not used:
Proposition 6 There are always symmetric equilibria in which the link




















,  =  =0
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rium of proposition 6 than in the one of proposition 4. The reason is
that the CSD and the exchange of a given country oﬀer complements. As
explained in the introduction, mergers of ￿rms that oﬀer complements
reduce prices.
Again, we do not have a unique equilibrium if −2 
 2.B u ti ti s
again easy to see that the CSD￿s pro￿ts are higher in the equilibrium de-
s c r i b e di np r o p o s i t i o n5t h a ni nt h eo n eo fp r o p o s i t i o n6 .F o rt h a tr e a s o n
and because proposition 6 describes equilibria that are due to coordina-
tion failures if  is low, we assume again that the CSDs coordinate on
the equilibrium described in proposition 5 whenever  − 2 
 2.
4.4 Horizontal integration of CSDs
We now look at a horizontally integrated structure, i.e. the two CSDs
are operated by one company. In this case, we have three players. The
operator of exchange  sets 
 and has payoﬀ function 
. The operator
of exchange  sets 
 and has payoﬀ function 
. Finally, the operator
of the two CSDs sets 
, 
,  and ;h i sp a y o ﬀ function is .W e
assume that the operator of the CSDs cannot price-discriminate between
the two countries, i.e. he has to set 
 = 
. This assumption can be
justi￿ed by the existence of competition authorities like the European
Commission in the EU that would not allow price discrimination. We
￿rst consider a purely legal integration of the CSDs. Concentrating only
on symmetric equilibria (
 = 
), we get
Proposition 7 (1) For  − 2 


















,  ≤ 

























,  =  =0
If  is low, i.e.  − 2 
 0,t h e n is low and the two exchanges
enter into perfect price competition that leads to a situation in which
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settlement and for the link are not unique, but only the weighted sum
+4
 of both. The reason is subtle, but important to note. Remember
that there are economies of scope in our model: if an investor decides to
sell abroad, he will buy abroad as well. If he is for example a country 
investor, then the transaction price he has to pay to the integrated CSDs
is  +2 
, the country  investor he sells to pays 
 and the country
 investor he buys from also pays 
. The total transaction price paid
by investors to the CSDs is thus  +4 
.I f n o w  increases and 4

decreases by the same amount so that  +4
 remains unchanged, then
the  investor pays more and the two investors from country  pay less.
However, it can be shown that now, 
 increases and 
 decreases
until the  investor is compensated for that. Thus, if  increases and
+4
 remains unchanged, the investors￿ equilibrium behavior does not
change.
We still look at  − 2 
 0 and compare the prices for settlement
and for the link given by the propositions 7, 3 and 5. The settlement
services of the two CSDs are substitutes, while their link services are
complements. For that reason, one would expect that 
 and 
 are
higher under horizontal integration, while  is higher under complete
separation and under vertical integration. However, since the prices for
settlement and for the link are not unique under horizontal integration,
we can only compare the weighted sum  +4 
. It is easy to show that
+4
 is higher under complete separation and under vertical integration
than it is under horizontal integration. The reason is closely related to
what was explained in the previous paragraph. Investors￿ choice only
depends on the weighted sum  +4 
. That reveals a relation between
the two settlement services on the one hand and the two link services on
the other: they are perfect complements. Using the link is bene￿cial for
investors only if they afterwards use the settlement service of one CSD.
And the settlement service of a CSD is used only if the link services are
used before. This is due to the economies of scope described above. As
the settlement services and the link services are complements, prices are
lower if all these services are provided by the same player, i.e. under
horizontal integration.
Finally, if  − 2  0, then the link is too expensive to be used and
purely legal horizontal integration and complete separation lead to the
same results.
Now consider a complete technical integration of the CSDs. I.e. the
two CSDs are operated on the same system and the operating costs of
the link are thus  =0 , while  =0as well. The equilibrium for this
case now follows directly from part (1) of proposition 7:
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 −  − ]
It should be mentioned here that a THI may entail substantial costs
that are to be borne by the operator of the integrated CSDs. Since we
ignore in our model these costs, proposition 8 describes a longer-term
equilibrium while in the short run, the operator of the CSD may add a
surcharge to its prices to cover the cost of THI.
5 Welfare analysis
We now compare the welfare characteristics of the diﬀerent industry
structures discussed above. We ￿rst determine the general net social
bene￿t function and describe the general welfare maximum. We than
calculate the net social bene￿ts for the diﬀerent industry structures.
5.1 Net social bene￿t function and welfare maxi-
mum
We start with the net bene￿ts from trade of the country A investors and
of the country B investors. Country A investors sell a volume of  +
 of stock A to country B investors and buy a volume of  + 
of stock B from country B investors. Those country A investors who do






Those country A investors who sell stock A have a bene￿t of selling it of
(
 − )+(
 −  − )






(1 − )  − (
 + ) − (
 + )
On top of that, country A investors who trade in country B must get
connected to country B. Note the following: Each investor who want to
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if he trades both stocks in country B. Furthermore, a situation in which
some country A investors trade in country B only stock A and some other
country A investors trade in country B only stock B is not possible. I.e.
the overall number of country A investors who get connected to country
Bi smax{ } and the costs for country A investors from getting
connected to country B are thus given by max{ }.T h e n e t
bene￿t of country A investors is given by the sum of these three ￿rst












2 +(  + )
−max{ } + (
 − )+(
 −  − )
−(
 + ) − (
 + )
We get the net bene￿ts  of country B investors in a similar way. The
net bene￿ts of the economy as a whole is given by









=(1−  − )[ +  +  + ] − ( + )
2 − ( + )
2
−2( + ) − max{ } − max{ } +1
It is now easy to determine the welfare maximum, i.e. the maximiser
of the function .I ti sg i v e nb y
Proposition 9 If 2  , then the welfare maximum is obtained with
 =  =  =  = 1
4.I f 2 
 ,t h e ni ti so b t a i n e dw i t h
 =  = 1
2,  =  =0 .
Note that it is optimal to have trading of both securities in both
countries and thus to use the link if the operating costs of the link are
relatively low (2  ).Given the relations described in the propositions
1 and 2, these welfare maximising trading volumes can be implemented
with the prices  =  = 1
2 + 1
2 and  =2  (prices equal to
marginal costs).
5.2 Comparison of social bene￿ts for diﬀerent in-
dustry structures
Taking now the results from the previous section, it is easy to calculate
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 −  − ]
2
The comparison of the net social bene￿ts is straightforward and given
by
Theorem 10 If 













To understand this result, we only have to compare equilibrium prices
since it is clear that the lower the equilibrium prices the higher the social
bene￿ts. The intuition for the diﬀerences in equilibrium prices for the
diﬀerent industry structures has been discussed already in section 4. If

2, then there is a strong complementary relation between the ser-
vices provided by the two CSDs. The two link services are complements.
And the link service of one and the settlement service of the other CSD
are complements. The prices are therefore lower if all these services are
oﬀe r e db yt h es a m ep l a y e ra n d
 
 
 = .I f 2,t h e n
the link is too expensive to be used. What matters are the settlement
services of the CSDs and these are neither substitutes not complements
if 2. Since trading and settlement within a country are comple-
ments, the prices for these services are lower if they are oﬀered by the
same player so that we get 

 
 = . Finally, if 2 
 ,t h e n




9Assume that LHI already leads to a cost saving eﬀect so that it reduces the link
operating costs to   .I f2 ≤ , then LHI would now outperform VI even if
2. Thus, horizontal integration is already the best type of consolidation if it
makes the economic cost of the link smaller than the cost of remote access.
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In this paper, we have analyzed the welfare implications of diﬀerent
structures of the securities trading and settlement industry in a two-
country model. The result of our analysis is remarkably simple: Com-
plete horizontal integration of CSDs leads to a higher welfare than ver-
tical integration of exchanges and CSDs and vertical integration leads
to a higher welfare than complete separation.
However, it should be emphasized that this paper is only a ￿rst step
to analyze a complex question. More research is needed to get the com-
plete picture and ￿nal policy conclusions should not yet be drawn. In
this context, two limitations of the model mentioned already in the in-
troduction need to be emphasized again: Firstly, we assume that the
CSDs cannot compete for the exchanges, i.e. each exchange is forced
to settle all trades in the domestic CSD. And secondly, we do not allow
for OTC trading (including internalization of trades by an international
custodian bank), i.e. all trades are executed on an exchange. Both as-
sumptions might have in￿uenced our results. It is left to future research
to look at the welfare implications of horizontal and vertical integration
in securities trading and settlement from other angles.
Another critical aspect of our model is the assumption that due to the
preferences of investors, all trades are cross-border trades, i.e. with the
buyer and seller located in diﬀerent countries. However, it is now easy to
predict what kind of results one would get under alternative assumptions.
The opposite extreme would be to assume that all trades are domestic
trades, i.e. between investors located in the same country. Country 
investors would have demand only for  securities and  investors only
for  securities. In this case, the link would never be used. Note that
there would now be no competitive relation between service providers
in diﬀerent countries. Accordingly, horizontal integration of CSDs and
complete separation would lead to exactly the same results. However,
vertical integration would lead to a higher welfare than separation and
horizontal integration since the only thing that matters is the fact that
in each country, the exchange and the CSD oﬀer complements. From
these consideration, a simple lesson can be learned. If domestic investors
have little interest in holding foreign securities, vertical integration of
domestic service providers may be desirable. If investors have instead
strong preferences for foreign securities, horizontal integration of CSDs
may be the best from a welfare perspective.
Finally, it should be emphasized that we did not look at horizontal
integration of exchanges. If we had done that in our model, we would
probably have come to the conclusion that exchanges should not merge
since they oﬀer substitutes. However, there may still be good reasons
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model. For example, mergers of exchanges lead to a concentration of
liquidity. This liquidity concentration eﬀect however does not occur in
our model.
7 Appendix A
In this appendix, the demand and supply functions of the investors for
given transaction prices and stock prices are determined. Each investor
selects the alternative that gives him the highest bene￿t according to
the tables in section 2. Note that in the bene￿ts for the alternatives 2 to
5, the name  of the respective investor does not occur, i.e. all investors
located in the same country have the same preferences over these four
alternatives. Similarly, all investors located in the same country have
the same preferences over the alternatives 6 to 9. To begin with, we



























. In this case, each investor selects either alternative









 ⇔  ≥ 















 ⇔  ≥ 1 − 





. It follows that 1 ≥ 2 ≥ 3.
I.e. all investors  ∈ [0 3] choose alternative 6,a l li n v e s t o r s ∈ [3 1]
choose alternative 2 and all investors  ∈ [11] choose alternative 1.





0,i f1  0







0,i f3  0
3,i f0 ≤ 3 ≤ 1
1,i f3 
 1
 =0,  =0
Here,  is the supply of stock  in country ,  is the supply of




. In this case, each investor selects either alternative












 ⇔  ≥ 1 − 















 ⇔  ≥ 





. It follows that 3 ≥ 2 ≥ 1.
I.e. all investors  ∈ [0 1] choose alternative 6,a l li n v e s t o r s ∈ [1 3]
choose alternative 4 and all investors  ∈ [31] choose alternative 1.
From that, we get exactly the same supply and demand functions as in













0,i f1  0







0,i f3  0
3,i f0 ≤ 3 ≤ 1
1,i f3 
 1
 =0,  =0
As one would expect,  is increasing in 
,  is decreasing in 

and both functions are decreasing in . Note that we do not necessarily
have 1 = 3. It is immediate that 1 
 3 ⇔ 	2
 ≥ 	4
.H e r e ,
country  investors  ∈ [0 3] choose alternative 6, i.e. sell stock  and
buy stock  in country .  investors  ∈ [3 1] choose alternative
2, i.e. sell stock  in country  and do not trade stock . Finally,
 investors  ∈ [11] choose alternative 1, i.e. do not trade at all. If
instead 3 
 1,w e￿nd 	4
 ≥ 	2
. In this case, all investors  ∈ [0 1]
choose alternative 6, all investors  ∈ [1 3] choose alternative 4 and
all investors  ∈ [31] choose alternative 1.
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0,i f5  0




with 5 ≡ 1 − 
































0,i f6  0







0,i f3  0
3,i f0 ≤ 3 ≤ 1
1,i f3 
 1
 =0  =0
with 6 ≡ 
 −  − ( + ) − (
 + 
).






}. This condition does not imply an






}. In this case, each investor selects









 ⇔  ≥ 





 ⇔  ≥

 +1− 







 ⇔  ≥ 
 +1− 
 − 
 −  −  − 2 +  ≡ 9
Here, we have 1+9 =2 8, i.e. 1−8 = 8−9.W eh a v et oc o n s i d e r
two sub-sub-cases:
(4a1) 1 ≥ 8, i.e. 1 ≥ 8 ≥ 9. Here, all investors  ∈ [0 9]
choose alternative 9, all investors  ∈ [9 1] choose alternative 2 and
all investors  ∈ [11] choose alternative 1. From this, we get the supply





0,i f9  0





1 − 9,i f1 − 9 ≤ 1






0,i f9  0




(4a2) 8 ≥ 1, i.e. 9 ≥ 8 ≥ 1. I.e. all investors  ∈ [0 1]
choose alternative 9, all investors  ∈ [1 8] choose alternative 9 ;a l l
investors  ∈ [8 9] choose alternative 1 and all investors  ∈ [91]
choose alternative 1. From this, we get the supply function for stock A





0,i f8  0







0,i f8  0
8,i f0 ≤ 8 ≤ 1
1,i f8 
 1
 =0  =0
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}. We consider the following two sub-
sub-cases:
(4b1) 6 ≥ 10 ≡ 1 − 





0,i f6  0







0,i f10  0
10,i f0 ≤ 10 ≤ 1
1,i f10 
 1
 =0  =0






}.We consider the following two sub-
sub-cases:
(4C1) 3 ≥ 11 ≡ 
 − 
 −  −  − 2 + 





0,i f11  0








0,i f11  0





3 − 11,i f3 − 11 ≤ 1
1,i f3 − 11 
 1







}. We consider the following two sub-
sub-cases:
(4d1) 5 ≥ 12 ≡ 





0,i f12  0







0,i f5  0
5,i f0 ≤ 5 ≤ 1
1,i f5 
 1
 =0  =0
(4d2) 12 ≥ 5. We get the same result as in the cases (4a2), (4b2)
and (4c2).
Finally, there are several other cases we do not discuss in details but
which are important and have to be kept in mind. These are cases where
all investors are indiﬀerent between at least two alternatives from 6 to






that the supply and demand may be given by any linear combination of
the supply and demand functions of the cases (1) and (2). The ￿ndings
for other cases are similar.
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Proof of propositions 1 and 2:
Proving these three proposition is very tedious, though not diﬃcult.
We therefore do not discuss the entire proof in details, but rather look
at a few cases only. Other cases can be dealt with in a similar way. To
derive the equilibrium stock prices and trading turnovers on the four
stock markets, we have to consider again several cases. We ￿rst consider
cases in which both stocks are traded:





}.W e ￿nd  =  ≥ 0 and  =0 ,
 =0 . An equilibrium would require that country  investors choose
 =  ≥ 0 and  =0 ,  =0 . Immediate candidates for this
are the following:











} and 8 ≥ 1,w h e r e1 ≡ 
 −  and
8 ≡
+1−−−	−2





0,i f8  0







0,i f8  0
8,i f0 ≤ 8 ≤ 1
1,i f8 
 1
 =0  =0
An equilibrium would require  =  and  = .N o t et h a t




























This is an equilibrium if 1
2 − 1
4( + ) − (
 + 




4( + ) and 
 = 1
2 + 1
4(+ ) all conditions above are ful￿lled. It
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} and 10 ≥ 6,w h e r e6 = 
 −  − ( +
) − (
 + 
) and 10 =1− 
 − (
 + 





0,i f8  0







0,i f8  0
8,i f0 ≤ 8 ≤ 1
1,i f8 
 1
 =0  =0
An equilibrium would require  =  and  = .N o t et h a t




























This is an equilibrium if 1
2 − 1
4( + ) − (
 + 




4( + ) and 
 = 1
2 + 1
4( + ) all conditions above (including
the two conditions for case (1)) are ful￿lled. However, the condition

 −( +) ≥ 1−
 implies ( +) ≤ 0 w h i c hi si ng e n e r a ln o t
possible.











} and 11 ≥ 3 (11 and














































),  =  =0
is an equilibrium











} and 12 ≥ 5 (12 and
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),  =  =0
is an equilibrium
Summary of the cases (A1) to (A4):
Comparing the results for the cases (A1), (A3) and (A4), we can
easily see that the conditions given in (A1) are broader than those in


























),  =  =0
is an equilibrium











} and 6 ≥ 10 and ￿nd that  =  and
 =  would imply 6 ≤ 10 which is in contradiction to the
conditions for case (A5).











} and 5 ≥ 12 and ￿nd
If




























),  =  =0
is an equilibrium
(B) Assume that the conditions for case (2) of Appendix A and











}.W e ￿nd in a way
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),  =  =0
is an equilibrium
(C) Assume that the conditions for case (3) of Appendix A and











}.W e￿nd that this
gives no equilibrium.
(D) Finally assume that the conditions for case (4) of Appendix A





}. T h i sc a s ei ss y m m e t r i ct o


























),  =  =0
is an equilibrium
If




























),  =  =0
is an equilibrium
Note that the conditions for the ￿r s ts u b - c a s ei nc a s e( D )a n dt h o s e
for the cases (A1) to (A4) overlap partially. The same holds for the
conditions for the second sub-case in case (D) and those for case (A6).
I . e .w em a yh a v em u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i a .I nt h e s ec a s e s ,w ea p p l yo re q u i -
librium re￿nement as described in section 3. If   ,w es e l e c tt h e
equilibrium described in (A1) to (A4) or (A6). If  
 ,w es e l e c t
the equilibrium described in (D). If  = , we select the allocation
described in proposition 1. It is easy to show that this is an equilibrium
allocation though we have not discussed this equilibrium here.
It is easy to see that the results produced so far give us a proof of
the propositions 1 and 2.
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P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 :
(1) Assume  ≤  and 
 = 





2 cannot be the case in equilibrium, because each exchange
could do better by slightly decreasing its price and on that way attracting
all the trade. Now assume  ≤  and 
 = 




























( + ) − 2][2












2 cannot be the case in equilibrium, because each
CSD could do better by slightly decreasing its price and on that way
attracting all the settlement of exchange trades. Thus, the following





















2 as given. Maximizing 1
with respect to  under the restriction  ≤  a n dt h e na s s u m i n g = 
gives  =  =m i n {1
2; 2
3+}. Thus, the following holds: If there is a
symmetric equilibrium in which the link is used, then it is characterized
by  =  =m i n {1
2; 2











2 and  =  =m i n {1
2; 2
3+} is indeed an equilibrium.
It is clear that 
 = 1

















3 + , i.e.  − 2 
 4. This implies  =
2
3 + .C h o o s i n g
 = 1




we show that no other strategy would give CSD A a higher pro￿t.
(i) Alternatively, CSD A could choose a response characterized by

  




 and  ≤ . This is the same as maximizing 2 with respect
to  +4
 under  +4
 ≤ − 2
3 − +2. Maximizing 2 without
a constraint leads to the maximizer +4
 = 2
3++2.T h i sg i v e s
ap r o ￿to f
 = 1
9
2. Since the constrained maximization cannot lead to
ah i g h e rp r o ￿t, choosing a response characterized by 
  
 and  ≤ 
can never be better than choosing 
 = 1
2 and  = .








 and  ≤ ,w h i c hi st h es a m e
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with respect to  under  ≤  − 2
3 − . Maximizing 3 without a
constraint leads to the maximizer  = 2




2. Since the constrained maximization cannot lead to a higher
pro￿t, choosing a response characterized by 
 
 
 and  ≤  can never
be better than choosing 
 = 1
2 and  = .









and  ≥ , i.e. maximizing










with respect to 
 gives 
 = 1
4[1−+ −] and 
 = 1
82.I ti se a s y


























with respect to  under  ≥  − 2






9  ≥  − 2
 −  − 2
3,i f10








4( − 2)]2,i f10
9  ≥  − 2
[ − 1
2( − 2)][1
2( − 2) − 1
3],i f10
9  ≤  − 2
It is easy to see that this is smaller than 1
9
2.









and  ≥ ,w h e r e




















(and  = 1
2− 1
3), i.e. violates the constraints so that it is clear that at
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 = 1
4[1 −  +  − ], i.e. violates the constraint  ≥ .









2 because  − 2 










This concludes the proof of part (1) of the proposition.
Now assume 1
22




2 and  =  would give 
 = 1
4[ − 2]. Again,
we show that no other strategy would give CSD A a higher pro￿t.
(i) CSD A could alternatively choose a response characterized by

  




 and  ≤ , i.e. maximizing 2 with respect to  +4 

under  +4 
 ≤ 1
2 +2 . Unconstrained maximization leads to  +
4
 =1− 3
4 −  +  + 1
2 which is greater than 1
2 +2 , because
−2  4. I.e. the maximizer is +4
 = 1
2+2 and the maximum
is 
 = 1
4[−2]. Thus, choosing a response characterized by 
  

and  ≤  can never be better than choosing 
 = 1
2 and  = .








 and  ≤ , i.e. 3
with respect to  under  ≤ 1
2. Unconstrained maximization leads to
 =1− 3
4− −+ 1
2 which is greater than 1
2,b e c a u s e−2  4.
I.e. the maximizer is  = 1
2 and the maximum is 
 = 1
4[ − 2].
Thus, choosing a response characterized by 
 
 
 and  ≤  can never
be better than choosing 
 = 1
2 and  = .









and  ≥ , i.e. maximizing 4 with respect to 
 gives 
 = 1
82.S i n c e
1
82 ≤ 1
4[ − 2] ⇔ 1







2,  =  = 1
2 can be an equilibrium only if 1
2 ≤ −2.








2( − ) and  ≥ ,






2,i f2 ≥  − 2
1








2 − ]2,i f2 ≥  − 2
1
4[ − 2],i f2 ≤  − 2
It is easy to see that 1
8[ + 1
2 − ]2 is greater than 1
4[ − 2], i.e. we






2,  =  = 1
2 can be an
equilibrium only if 2 ≤  − 2.
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2(−) and  ≥ ,w h e r e
 = 6. Unconstrained maximization leads to

 = 1
4[1−+ −] (and  = 1
4+ 1
2), i.e. to 
−
  0 so that it




2(−) leads to 
 = 1
4[1−+−], i.e. to 
−




2( − ) cannot be the only binding constraint. Maximizing






8,w h i c hi sg r e a t e r
than 
 = 1





2( − ) and  ≥  is  =  and 
 = 1




This concludes the proof of part (2) of the proposition.
¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4 :
(1) Maximizing 
 under |−| ≤ 1





 under |−| ≤ 1
2(−)









4[1 −  +  − 2
] gives 
 = 1
6(1 −  −  +2 ), 
 =
1
6(1−− +2). I.e. if there is a symmetric equilibrium in which the







6(1 −  −  +2 ). We now only need to check under
which conditions this is indeed an equilibrium.
(2) Assume  ≥ , 
 = 1




 +2 ). If exchange A chooses 
 = 1
6(1 −−  +2),i ta c h i e v e sa
pro￿to f
 = 1
182. Alternatively, exchange A could choose a response
characterized by  −  ≥ 1
2( − ). However, if  is suﬃciently high,





6(1− − +2), 
 = 1
6(1− − +2 )
and some  ≥ 1
2.I f C S D A c h o o s e s 
 = 1
6(1 −  −  +2 ) and
 = ,t h e ni ta c h i e v e sap r o ￿to f
 = 1
182. Alternatively, it could
choose other responses. However, which responses are possible depends
on . If for example  
 , CSD A cannot choose a response that is
characterized by  ≤ .F u r t h e r m o r e ,i f is suﬃciently large, it is clear
that choosing a response characterized by  −  ≥ 1
2( − ) cannot
l e a dt oah i g h e rp r o ￿tt h a n 1
182. Similarly, if  is suﬃciently large, it
is clear that choosing a response characterized by  −  ≥ 1
2( − )
cannot lead to a higher pro￿tt h a n 1
182 because such a response would
imply that CSD A does not settle exchange trades but makes pro￿to n l y
from the link which is hardly used because  is high. Thus, it is clear




6(1 −  −  +2 ), 
 = 
 = 1
6(1 −  −  +2 ) and
 =  ≥  are equilibria in which the link is not used.
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P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5 :
The proof is very similar to that of proposition 3 and therefore omit-
ted.
¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n6 :
The proof is very similar to that of proposition 4 and therefore omit-
ted.
¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n7 :
(1) We ￿rst determine the best response of the operator of the CSDs
on 
 = 
 (under the constraint 
 = 
):
















 − 2 − 2]


















We now maximize  under the constraint  ≥ .W eh a v e







Maximizing with respect to 
 gives 
 = 1















2. With that we get the following
result:
If 
2, we get as best responses all strategies that are character-
ized by  +4 
 =1− 1
2 +  +  − 2
 and  ≤ .
If 2, we get as best responses all strategies that are character-
ized by 
 = 1
4[1 −  +  − 2
] and  ≥ .
( 2 )W en o wp r o v ep a r t( 1 )o ft h ep r o p o s i t i o n :




2. I.e. if there is a symmetric equilibrium with




2.A s s u m e




2 is according to (1) given by +4
 =1− 1
2++−
and  ≤ . Finally, it is easy to check that 
 = 1
2 is a best response
of exchange  on  +4 
 =1− 1
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August 2004( 3 )W en o wp r o v ep a r t( 2 )o ft h ep r o p o s i t i o n .
Assume  ≥  and some strategies 
 and 
 = 




2( − ),w eh a v e















 and then setting 
 = 
 is the same as maximizing

1
 which gives 
 = 1
4[1 −  +  − 2
]. I.e. if there is a symmetric





].N o wa s s u m e2.W ek n o wf r o m( 1 )
that if there exists a symmetric equilibrium, it is characterized by 
 =
1
4[1 −  +  − 2
] and  ≥ . I.e. we know that if there is a symmetric
equilibrium, it is characterized by 
 = 
 =







6 ,  ≥ .
To conclude the proof, we only have to show that exchange A cannot











6 if  ≥  for some  ≥ .H o w e v e r , t h i s i s
immediate since the only potential better response would be to select a
response characterized by 
−
 ≥ 1
2(−).B u ti f is suﬃciently high,
this would require a very small 
 which may even lead to a negative
pro￿t for exchange A.
¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n9 :
The proof is very simple and therefore omitted.
¥
Proof of theorem 10:
The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
¥
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